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Human errors in engineering processes do not usually get analyzed and evaluated in 
terms of their risks, much less management errors. Not much effort is expended on 
management errors and risks analysis, probably because not many have come to realize 
the connection between those errors and the product functional problems.   
Product functionality is influenced by a number of factors, including its design and 
production. Design and production are controlled by humans: operators, engineers and 
managers. Operators run production. Engineers create product designs and systems for 
production. Managers come into play with their supervision, planning, task scheduling 
and decision making.  
This research aims to answer Felix Redmill’s call for research on the evaluation and 
estimation of management risks. This work suggests that manager’s errors indeed 
contribute to issues that lead to product functional problems.   These errors and issues 
need to be addressed. The result of which is beneficial in the achievement of total quality.  
The research employed the Human Factors Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(HF PFMEA) methodology to get to the root causes of product issues. Results from the 
research project revealed that management errors, in resources management and 
development and in project planning and communication tasks, contribute to product 
functional problems. The research method also allowed management risks to be evaluated 
in terms of priority number values that are helpful and important in determining priorities 
for improvement action plans.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
  
In engineering processes, human errors rarely get analyzed and evaluated in terms of their 
risks, much less management errors. To the author’s knowledge, based on her research 
and her eleven years of work experience as a Product Development Engineer, not much 
effort has been given to the analysis of the connection between management errors and 
product functional problems.  
Product functionality is influenced by a number of factors, including design and 
production. Design and production are controlled by humans: operators, engineers and 
managers. Humans obviously influence product functionality. Operators run the systems 
in product manufacturing, while engineers create the product designs and the systems 
used. Managers come into play in supervising the operators and engineers, in planning 
and taking care of task schedules, and in making decisions related to the product and its 
production.  
In this research, the author made use of the indirect connection between management 
errors and the product functional problems. That indirect connection or link is composed 
of the engineers and their tasks. The engineers have direct influence on product 
functionality through their tasks. The managers have direct influence on engineers and 
their tasks. That link therefore, was used as the starting point to conduct and employ the 
systematic method of Human Factors Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (HF 
PFMEA) to analyze the human errors in the engineering processes that caused product 
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functional issues. The same method and data was then used to determine and evaluate the 
management errors and risks that led to product functional issues.  
Felix Redmill, a self-employed consultant on risk management, project management and 
quality improvement, and a Member of the Institute of Quality Assurance, wrote in 2002 
that risk analyses force analysts to identify and enquire into risks and their causes and 
consequences. In his papers, which cover human factors risk analysis, he argues for the 
need of attention toward the analysis and understanding of the risks posed by 
management. He notes that, historically, the risks posed by management are neither 
addressed by risk analysis nor included in safety cases (Redmill, 2002).   
The author agrees with Redmill that not addressing the risks posed by all human 
operators, including engineers and managers, means that risk analyses are necessarily 
underestimates (Redmill, 2002). If management’s issues are included in risk analyses and 
are addressed, not only would there be a truer representation of risks, but “there would 
also be a basis for the assessment and improvement of an organization’s corporate 
governance” (Redmill, 2006).   
The research here reported was conducted to answer Redmill’s call for research on the 
evaluation and estimation of management risks.  
This research was conducted at one of the leading semiconductor companies in the 
country. The data and information used in the research analysis were gathered from one 
of the company’s factories through the help of 15 of its Product Engineers and Group 
Leaders. The research concentrated on issues encountered in Product Engineering. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
Presented in the first two sections of this literature review chapter is developed 
information relating to the definition of total quality, and the obstacles in achieving 
TQM.  The definition of total quality is important in understanding the quality 
management concept.  Knowing the obstacles to TQM is helpful in achieving TQM.   
In the third section is a concise discussion of the concept of continuous improvement.  
Among the benefits from FMEA is continuous improvement. It is also a key component 
in achieving total quality.  
The last three sections of the chapter contain fundamental information on HF PFMEA 
and FMEA methodology and components.  Understanding the FMEA components is 
important in gathering good and valid FMEA data. 
 
2.1. Total Quality 
Quality is one of the fundamental concerns of management. As defined in the American 
Management Association’s Management Handbook, “quality is conformance to 
standards or requirements” (Fallon 1983, 4-107). The standards of performance are set 
by management based on their interpretation of the demands of the market. Successful 
companies have expanded the definition of quality to include design and service quality 
by “incorporating the requirements of the customer into the product design and service 
while retaining conformance quality” (Brunetti, 1993, 3). Companies and organizations 
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now translate customers’ words and ideas into product design and service specifications. 
This is total quality. 
Customers are the important factors in this total quality definition.  A classical sense of 
customers that most people had is that they are the ones who pay directly for the product 
and services offered.  This also has expanded.  Nowadays, the most widely used 
definition is that the customer is the next process (Brunetti, 1993, 3). This is the 
expansion of the classical idea of the customers to include not only those who were 
traditionally called customers, but also the myriad of internal customers, i.e., employees. 
Thus, this definition of total quality includes those whose work-product is an integral part 
of satisfying the ultimate customer’s requirements. 
 
2.2. Obstacles to Total Quality Management (TQM) Success 
Total Quality Management (TQM) is a management approach for long-term success 
through customer satisfaction.  All members of the organization must participate in the 
TQM efforts to improve processes, products, services and even their culture (Brunetti 
1993, 21). 
Several studies have developed instruments to measure quality management or TQM 
(Tari, Molina and Castejon, 2005). Rose Sebastianelli and Nabil Tamimi, from the 
University of Scranton, performed a study in 2003, wherein they conducted a survey-
based research. Their research focused on the obstacles associated with managing the 
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TQM transformation. Their factor analysis on managers’ ratings of frequently cited 
barriers to TQM revealed five underlying constructs:  
1. Inadequate human resources development and management. 
2. Lack of planning for quality. 
3. Lack of leadership for quality.  
4. Inadequate resources for TQM.  
5. Lack of customer focus.  
The two benefits from the FMEA methodology used in this research are problem 
prevention and continuous improvement. In order to achieve improvement, and 
eventually TQM, problems must be realized and analyzed. In the analysis, root-causing 
problems are critical. Root causes must be detected at the earliest point possible, if they 
cannot be totally prevented (Khuram 2003). 
 
2.3. The Concept of Continuous Improvement 
Continuous improvement on everyone’s work is the main concern of TQM (Brunetti, 
1993). A central principle of it is mistakes may be made by people. Most of them are 
caused or at least permitted, either by faulty systems and/or processes. As such, the root 
cause of those mistakes can be identified and eliminated. Repetitions can also be 
prevented by changing or improving the process. Continuously improving capabilities, 
people, processes, technology, and machine capabilities all lead to continuously 
improving overall results (Khuram, 2003).  
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There is no denying that most companies and organizations allocate time and resources 
for their people development. Engineers get required to attend to more and more trainings 
as preventive measures for possible errors they could commit.  
Figure 1 is an illustration of the effort expended on different causes of accidents and their 
actual importance. This illustration was used by Redmill in his article, “Human Factors 
in Risk Analysis”, published in 2002. His intention was to show that the effort expended 
on the improvements on management failures is relatively smaller than its actual 
importance. Based on the author’s observations, from her eleven years of work 
experience as a Product Engineer, she sees this illustration as relevant and applicable not 
only on safety issues but also on engineering process and/or product issues. 





2.3.1. Mechanisms of Prevention  
Having a quality culture does not mean that one can never go wrong. It implies that there 
should be mechanisms in place to detect errors and problems. Corrections are made and 
they are made at the root cause. Not doing so means merely covering up the problem 
symptoms. 
The three major mechanisms of prevention are (Khuram, 2003): 
1. Preventing mistakes from occurring. 
2. Where mistakes can't be absolutely prevented, detecting them early to prevent 
them being passed down the value added chain.  
3. Where mistakes recur, stopping production until the process can be corrected, to 
prevent the production of more defects. 
 
The following remaining sections of the chapter provide the review of the HF PFMEA 
and FMEA concepts and methodology that were used in the research. Understanding the 
components of FMEA is helpful in understanding the method and results of the research. 
  
2.4. Human Factors Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA)  
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a standardized and systematic 
methodology for evaluating ways in which failures can occur in a system, design, 
process, equipment, or service. It is a known risk management tool that when used 
correctly eliminates risk in a process, equipment or service. Benefits from FMEA are 
problem prevention and continuous improvement (Bolanos, 2007).  
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Human Factors Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, HF PFMEA, is the 
application of FMEA on human factors. It provides a systematic way of analyzing human 
errors and their risks. It involves the analysis of tasks within a process to identify the 
human errors that may lead to failures, and the worst-case effects of those errors. HF 
PFMEA is based on the philosophy that human errors must be accounted for and can be 
controlled. It can be done by managing the performance shaping factors affecting the 
human performance (Dunkle, 2005).  HF PFMEA also provides a generic method that 
can be applied to a variety of processes. 
Table 1 shows the FMEA template that was used in the data collection for this research.  
 
Table 1. The FMEA template used for the research (Source: Failure Modes and Effects 





























Team,  Work 
Area_Main 
Area.
Sub Area, Step with 
in your operation, 
Sub Module, Sub 
Component of your 
module
What will go 
wrong or could 
go wrong or 
how would you 
identify that 
something is 
wrong at this 
operation
What will happen 
to the product/the 
factory if this 
happens? What is 
the consequence 
of this happening?
Is this because of a 
Human Error or mis 
process, is there the 
slightest possibility 
that a human 
committed this error 
or is the cause of the 
error. In what step of 
the operation the 
operator committed 
the mistake. Include 
all possible situations 
where a human can 
cause this failure 
mode or event in the 
factory.
Are you relying on a 
human to prevent 
this from happening 
(preventing column 




at some point in the 
process, either this 
same operation or 
an operation 
downstream
Are you relying on 
a human to 
Detect this from 
happening 
(preventing 





some point in the 
process, either 
this same 












2.5. FMEA Components 
To fully understand the FMEA methodology, it is important to first understand its key 
components. The following sub-sections discuss the FMEA components. 
 
 2.5.1. Failure Mode  
The potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which the process could potentially 
fail to meet the process requirements or design intent (Bolanos, 2007).  In order to do so, 
tasks within a process need to be identified.  In this research, the tasks considered, to get 
the failure modes, are the tasks involved in the test program implementation process.  
 
2.5.2. Effect and Severity 
Potential effects of the failure are defined as the effects of the failure mode on the product 
and/or on the customer. Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a 
given failure mode. It is a relative rank that measures, in an objective manner, the impact 
that may result if the failure mode happens (Bolanos, 2007). Table 2 lists the severity 
ranks used for the evaluations and analyses done in the research. 
 
Table 2. Severity ranks. (Source: FMEA Ranks’ reference criteria tables, rev04a. Internal 
Publication. Bolaños, E. J. CR AT. 2006.) 
 
Rank Severity (%loss) * per 
unit of measurement 
Criteria Comments (commonly used) 
(commonly used) 
1 0.0000 – 0.00009 No Fallout, Negligible 0 devices lost. Key Word: Zero, 
once, one. 
2 0.0001 – 0.4999 Very low yield fallout, almost 1-5 devices lost among many. 
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unnoticeable. Low line yield 
loss 
Key words: Two, couple and few 
(3-5). 
3 0.5000 – 0.9999 Noticeable yield fallout. Minor 
yield fallout, but not meeting 
yield issue (YI) criteria 
More than five but less than 10 
devices. Key words: Several 
4 1.0000 – 4.9999 Significant line yield loss. 
Major Yield loss. Meeting YI 
criteria 
More than 10 devices. Key Words: 
Many, level excursion 
5 5.0000 – 9.9999 Major Yield hit High level excursion 
6 10.000 – 24.999 Major Yield hit  Required re-screening 
7 25.000 – 49.999  Major Yield hit  Required re-screening 
8 50.000 – 74.999 Major Yield hit  Required re-screening 
9 75.000 – 99.999 Major Yield hit  Required re-screening 
10 100.00% Complete loss of material Scrap 100% of the devices 
 
2.5.3. Cause and Occurrence 
Potential causes are defined in terms of why the failure could occur. They are described as 
something that can be corrected or can be controlled (Bolanos 2007). The most important 
considerations in the analysis of this component include the definition and listing of all the 
possible failure causes assignable to each and every single potential failure mode.  
Occurrence is the rank associated with the root cause of the potential failure mode. It is the 
measure of the frequency of occurrence. In an objective parameter it is called the 
probability of occurrence (Bolanos 2007). In this research, this parameter was defined as a 
function of a complete calendar year against the amount of working shifts the factory has 
in that year. It was calculated based on the occurrence per unit time. Table 3 describes in 





Table 3. Occurrence ranks. (Source: FMEA Ranks’ reference criteria tables, rev04a. 
Internal Publication. Bolaños, E. J. CR AT. 2006.) 
 








1 0.01%  Once per Year Key words: Remote, Once ever 
Probability of  0.000009 to 0.000115741 
2 0.05% Once per quarter Key words: Very Low 
Probability of  0.000116 to 0.000462963 
3 0.14% Once per Month Key words: Low 
Probability of 0.000463 to 0.001388889 
4 0.23% Few (5) per Quarter. 3-
5 events per qtr 
Key words: Low-Moderate 
Probability of  0.00139 to 0.002314815 
5 0.60% Once per week  Key words: Mid-Moderate 
Probability of 0.002315 to 0.005952381 
6 1.39% Several (10) per month. 
5-10 events per month 
Key words: High-Moderate 
Probability of 0.006 to 0.013888889 
7 2.98% Few (5) per week Key words: High 
3-5 events per week Probability of 0.014 to 0.029761905 
8 7.14% Many (>10) per week. 
10 to 12 events per 
week 
Key words: High 
Probability of 0.0298 to 0.071428571 
9 50.00% Many (>10) per day Key words: Very High 
Happens every two 
hours 
Probability of 0.072 to 0.5 
10 100.00% Many (>10) per shift. 
Event happens every 
hour. 
Key words: Extremely High 
Probability of  0.51 to 1.0 
 
 
2.5.4. Process Control Mechanisms  
Process control mechanisms are the controls that are currently in place to either detect the 
failure mode should it occur, or prevent it from occurring. The two common types of 
process controls to consider are: prevention and detection systems. The first prevents the 
cause while the second detects the cause of the potential failure mode (Bolanos 2007). The 
ranks used in the FMEA were developed based on the time-to-detect probability or 
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expected through put time (TPT), that the product may have during the process. Table 4 
shows the ranks used in the research.  
Table 4. Detection and containment ranks. (Source: FMEA Ranks’ reference criteria 




Criteria [Extension or magnitude of the issue on 
downstream operations]  





Extremely High probability of detecting within 
the same lot [thus preventing excursions on 
downstream, modules] 
100% of units accounted @op0 
Time to Detect: 1-3 hrs 
2 Internal Very High probability of detecting the issue 
within two lots [will detect at the start of the 
second/next lot] 
50% of units accounted @op0 
50% of units accounted @op0+1 
Time to Detect:  3-6 hrs 
3 Internal High probability of detecting the issue within a 
few lots. [No more than 3 lots affected] 
50% of units accounted @op0+1 and 
@op0+2 
Key Words: Few [3-5] 
Time to Detect:  6-9 hrs 
 
4 Internal High probability of detecting the issue within a 
few lots. [No more than 5 lots affected] 
50% of units accounted @op0+2 
50% of units accounted @op0+3 
Key Words: Few [3-5] 
Time to Detect: 1 day 
5 Internal Moderate risk / probability of not detecting until 
several lots are affected. 
50% of units accounted @op0+3 
50% of units accounted @BI^ 
Key Words: Several [5-10] 
Time to Detect: 1-2 days 
6 Internal Considerable risk / medium probability of not 
detecting until many lots are processed. Can 
detect at the test/BI operation [in the case of an 
assembly issue] 
100% of units accounted @BI 
Key Words: Many [>10] 
Time to Detect: 2-3 days 
7 Internal Detection point is at our test operations. High 
Risk. [Post test issues that may be detected by 
downstream modules like final visual] 
50% of units accounted @BI 
50% of units accounted @Test 
Time to Detect: 3-4 days 
8 Internal Very low probability (but still some) of 
detecting at the test operations. Will be detected 
at the final visual inspections. 
50% of units accounted @Test 
[End of 
process] 
50% of units accounted @FVI 
  Time to Detect: 4-5 days 
9 External Extremely low probability of detecting within 
the factory, will have DPM impact 
100% of units accounted @End° 
+ Cost of addressing customer issue 
Time to Detect: 5-7 days 
10 External No probability of detecting within the factory, 
will have considerable DPM impact 
100% of units accounted @End°  
+ Cost of addressing customer issue 




2.5.5. Risk Priority Number 
Part of the FMEA analysis is the calculation of the Risk Priority Number (RPN). This is a 
simple parameter that is the result of the product of the three ranks assigned to each of the 
failure modes. The three ranks are the severity (SEV), the occurrence (OCC), and the 
detection (DET). The RPN formula is noted in equation (1). 
RPNDETOCCSEV     (1) 
RPN is a simple criticality index number. The use of RPN is an extremely effective way to 
determine the risk priorities in an FMEA. Those with the highest values have the highest 
risks (Bolanos, 2007).  
RPN computation may also be adjusted by weighting the three parameters depending on 
the concern of the analysis. Additional weight constants may be used for the areas that 
need more focus on. 
 
2.6. FMEA Model 
In Figure 2 is the FMEA model showing its components. Understanding all potential 
failure modes and exploring the methods to detect and prevent problems before they occur 
are key ingredients to a good FMEA (Bolanos, 2007). Devising and recommending 
possible action plans, which would reduce high risk failure modes, should not be the end 
of the method. It is important to monitor the process or system after the implementation of 
the recommended actions to verify their effectiveness. 
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Figure 2. FMEA model. (Source: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Training. FMEA – 





In summary, the review showed that TQM effort involves everyone in the organization. 
Everyone is expected to contribute to attain total quality. The review also showed that 
having a quality culture does not mean zero error. It implies the importance of having 
control mechanisms to detect errors and problems. Corrections must be made at the root 
cause. Different sources of errors include equipment, process and people. For this 
research, focus was on human errors, specifically on management errors. HF PFMEA 
methodology was used to analyze errors in engineering processes and tasks, which were 
later tied with management tasks and errors. 
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Chapter 3 – Research Method 
In this chapter is the discussion of the method used in the research. The first section 
describes the data collection procedure and the second section describes the application 
of the HF PFMEA method in the analysis and evaluation of management errors. 
 
3.1. Data Collection 
The research was conducted in one of the factories of one of the leading semiconductor 
companies in the country. The research work was conducted while the author was a 
Graduate Technical Intern at the company.  
Initial data collected consisted of production test issues that occurred over a period of 
three years, 2006 to 2008. Data was extracted from the company’s issues database using a 
Quality and Reliability tool. The issues collected were first categorized based on the 
sources of the errors. The categories assigned for the problem sources are human-error, 
machine-error and non-Product Engineering (non-PE) issues.  
The categorization of the issues was done by the author with the help of the company’s 
Product Engineers, who owned and were also involved in the issues in question. 
Individual meetings were called in order to collect the information necessary for the 
categorization. The analyses done were focused on the problems that were owned by the 
Product Engineering Department and were human-error related.  
The excursion data collected was used as the starting point to identify the processes that 
need to be analyzed. The necessary information was collected from the Product 
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Engineers, who were involved on the issues, through individual interviews and e-mail 
exchanges. Other senior Product Engineers, who are also experts on the processes in 
question, were asked for inputs on the analyses of the issues. They all have owned more 
than three products and they were responsible for the implementation of the processes 
and controls on the processes identified. 
 The FMEA template was presented to the Engineers as a guide for them to provide the 
information and data needed for the research. The template contained sets of questions 
for each column that need to be filled-up with information. They served as a guide for the 
Engineers, not only for them to correctly follow the FMEA method, but also to keep them 
focused on the human factors concern of the research.  
In addition to the actual documented issues that occurred, the author also asked the 
engineers to include all other undocumented problems they encountered or could also 
possibly encounter on their processes. The undocumented issues refer to the errors that 
the engineers committed in their tasks but did not have any effect on the product, due to 
early detection. Such errors do not get documented as they do not produce any impact on 
the product. As such, they are not considered as valid issues. The intention here was to 




3.2. HF PFMEA and Data Analysis 
The engineering processes identified in the research were determined based on the list of 
the human-error related issues collected. The processes were then broken down into tasks 
in order to determine all other possible issues and potential failure modes for each task.  
Each failure mode was carefully and thoroughly analyzed to determine all the possible 
effects and root causes. Root causes were identified after asking and answering “why” 
several times and until all possible factors were considered.   
The risks were evaluated and identified according to the FMEA’s evaluation criteria, 
which were discussed in the FMEA components section in Chapter 2 (Literature Review) 
of this report.   
Severity was used as the measurement factor for the effect of each failure mode on the 
product. This is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a given failure mode. 
Rank range is from one to ten, which is equivalent to its criteria range from no or 
negligible product fallout to 100% fallout or complete loss of materials. 
 In this research, the impacts of the errors were measured with respect to the impact of the 
effect on the product. If the errors committed resulted to zero fallout, the severity (SEV) of 
that effect is zero. This means there was no impact on the product yield and quality. Errors 
that fall in this case are usually the errors that get detected early in the production flow. 
The detection control mechanism for such failure modes and errors are good and effective.  
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The other end of the rank suggests that either products failed at test, thereby affecting the 
product output, or products passed, and would only later fail once used by the customers. 
The later suggests worst-case scenario because of the impact to product quality. It also 
means no working detection control mechanism was in place.     
Each root cause was assigned with occurrence rank numbers, OCC, ranging from one to 
ten. OCC is the measure of the frequency of occurrence in an objective parameter called 
the probability of occurrence. This parameter was defined as a function of a complete 
calendar year against the amount of working shifts that the factories have in a year. For 
this research, the table was readily available from the factory. One is equivalent to once 
per year while 10 is equivalent to an occurrence of more than 10 times per shift, which is 
also equivalent to the event happening or occurring every hour.  
Detection (DET) values were also assigned to each cause and effect. FMEA detection rank 
was developed based on the time to detect probability or expected through put time (TPT) 
that the products may have during the process. For the research, the rank table for this 
parameter was also readily available in the factory.  Controls in place determine or affect 
the value of the detection. A rank value of one is equivalent to one to three hours of time-
to-detect. A rank of 10 is equivalent to a time-to-detect value of more that seven days. 
Also part of the FMEA analysis done is the calculation of the RPN. RPN is the result of 
the product of the three ranks assigned to each failure mode, which are the severity (SEV), 
the occurrence (OCC) and the detection (DET). As given in equation (1) in Chapter 2 of 
this report, RPN = SEV x OCC X DET. This value is a criticality index that dictates the 
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priority of the risks. With this value, the team or organization knows where to place the 
















Chapter 4 – Results 
Discussed in this chapter are the data collected in the research and the results of the 
analysis done. The important error definitions to understand the results of this research 
are presented in the first section. Section 2 presents the issues that were used in the 
FMEA analysis.  Sections 3 and 4 contain the management errors identified, as well as 
the results from the analysis and evaluation of those errors. In the last section of this 
chapter is the summary and conclusion made from the research data and its analysis. 
 
4.1. Definitions and Considerations 
In order to avoid confusion, the different errors used in the research and results 
discussion are defined below:  
1. Engineer errors refer to errors committed by the engineers while performing their 
tasks, i.e. test program integration, test program implementation, and fuse file 
release. 
2. Manager errors refer to errors committed by the managers while performing their 
management tasks and responsibilities, i.e. project planning, resource 
development and management, and daily tasks and workload planning and 
allocation. 
3. Engineer errors were used as the link between the product functional problem and 
the manager errors.   
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4.2. Issues  
Figure 3 shows the summary of the number of documented excursions or production test 
issues collected. There were a total of 43 documented production test issues found. 
Twenty-nine of the issues were human-error related.  The nine machine-error problems 
were not used in this research. The remaining five issues, which were classified as to 
have come from non-Product Engineer (non-PE) process issues were also not used in the 
research. They require investigation of issues coming from different departments other 
than the Product Engineering Department, and they are not within the scope of this 
research.  
Figure 3. Number of documented production test issues from 2006 to 2008 and the 
sources of the problems. 




Human Machine/Material Non-PE Process
# of Documented Test 
Issues (2006-2008)
29 9 5




The human-error related issues were further classified based on the processes from where 
the problems occurred. Figure 4 shows that 18 out of the 29 PE issues came from 
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problems on the test program implementation process. Eight issues came from disposition 
process problems, two from fuse file implementation process issues and one from the 
Statistical Bin Limit (SBL) computation problem. 
Figure 4. Number of documented production test issues from 2006 to 2008. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Test Program (TP) change implementation 
problem
Disposition problem
Fuse file release problem
Statistical Bin Limit (SBL) computation problem





Fuse file release 
problem
Statistical Bin Limit 
(SBL) computation 
problem
Production Test Issues (Human-Errors) 18 8 2 1
Production Test Issues (Human-Errors)
 
 
The problem on the SBL computation was found to be a simple honest mistake 
committed by the engineer. The problem or cause prevention was implemented by adding 
automated improvements on the process. No management-related issue was attached to 
the root cause of this failure mode.  
The eight disposition problems were also found to be free of management errors. The 
errors were committed due to several reasons, including negligence to documented 
instructions, outdated response flow documents and un-documented response flow 
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updates.  Additional automation and reviews were identified as the corrective and 
preventive measures for these issues.  
Both the fuse file release and test program implementation processes contain issues with 
root causes that came from management errors. Table 5 lists the problems from both 
processes. Eighteen issues came from the test program implementation process and two 
from the fuse file release process, totaling to 20 issues.  
Table 5. Problems encountered on the test program implementation and fuse file release 
processes. 
Process Problem Number of occurrence 
Test program implementation Wrong test program code implementation 10 
Test program implementation Wrong down-binning rule implementation 4 
Test program implementation Wrong test program release setup 4 
Fuse file release Problem in fuse file release 2 
 
The 20 issues listed came from four different errors on two processes, test program 
implementation and fuse file release.  After further investigation and analysis, it was 
found out the five out of the 20 documented issues were related to manager’s errors.  
The author also tried to collect a list of undocumented errors committed by the engineers 
to compare it with the documented issues. There was, however, no useful data collected, 




4.3. Management Errors  
Figure 5 shows the list of manager errors identified as the root cause of the human errors 
committed by the engineers that led to functional product issues. 
Figure 5. Result of the root-cause tracking done in the research. (Appendix A contains the 
complete root-cause tracking data for the research.) 
  
 
Based on the interview results regarding the issue of a skipped detection control step, 
poor headcount planning problem was identified to be the best-fitting error committed by 
the manager. At the time the error was committed, there were only two engineers 
working on all test program activities for that particular product. Tasks included test 
program integration, test program correlation, pilot run, production release, and initial 
production data monitoring. On average, a test program release happened every other 
week. With only two engineers working on all those tasks, time is limited to perform and 
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finish all tasks in time. Due to that limitation, engineers skipped a validation process that 
later resulted to product failures. Full validation on the test program was not done before 
the production release.  According to a senior Group Leader who was asked about the 
issue, a better forecast could have been made on the headcount requirements for that 
product, had the manager considered product complexity and demand forecast in his plan. 
From the interview results, the issue on a wrong spec input was related by the owner to 
poor workload planning. The engineer, who was responsible for the mistake, recounted 
that there was an imbalance in the work assignments among members of the team at that 
time. His work-load was way much heavier than most members of the team. The engineer 
admitted to having accidentally committed the error out of exhaustion. Although the 
author believes that the engineer could have raised his work-load issue, it still remains 
that the manager has the responsibility of looking at his workforce and making sure 
everyone is given the proper amount of task to perform for the success of their product or 
project. 
The issue on the wrongly assigned flow in the program resulted from a training problem. 
The engineer did not get the necessary training in order to successfully accomplish her 
tasks in the program integration. She was trained, but the training was incomplete. 
According to the problem owner, there was no training plan available for test program 
integrators at that time.  Resource development planning is one of the tasks the manager 
was expected to take care of. As it turned out, the manager failed to make sure his 
engineers get the appropriate training for them to perform their tasks.  
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As for the remaining issues, according to data and information from product owners, two 
of the product issues resulted from poor communication of project requirements. Not all 
the required test program and fuse file changes were presented in the appropriate 
meetings. Change communications were done off-line and the communicated changes 
were incomplete. The insufficient change information requests that were done resulted to 
an incomplete work that caused functional problems on the product. The engineers tried 
to address this specific issue by creating a Test Program Change Committee that 
approves all test program change requests. The committee was also made responsible for 
the change request distribution. 
Appendix A contains the completed HF PFMEA table containing all the root-cause 
tracking done on all the issues covered. The root cause column shows the series of 
answers from the series of why’s asked regarding the root cause of the problems. 
Information on the table came from the Product Engineers who owned and were involved 
in the issues. 
 
4.3.1. Risk Priority Numbers   
Table 6 summarizes the RPN range for each management error for each possible effect 
on the product. The RPN values were calculated based on the SEV values assigned for 
each effect, OCC values assigned for each cause and DET values assigned for each cause 
and effect. The formula given by equation 1 in Chapter 2 of the report (RPN = SEV * 
OCC * DET) was used in the computations.  
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Based on the data that was gathered, RPN is higher on issues the led to under-testing of 
products and lower on those that caused delay in the process. Similar errors may have 
different RPN values depending on the severity of the effects, the probability of 
occurrence, and the probability of the time-to-detect.  Data showed that SEV is the factor 
that defined most of the differences in the RPN values for each error. There were no 
significant differences among management errors in terms of OCC and DET. Appendix 
A contains the table with all the numbers assigned per cause and effect, which led to the 
RPN values summarized in Table 7.  
Under-testing proved to be the most severe effect that came out of the human errors 
committed. They need to be in the top priority in terms of implementing prevention and 
detection mechanisms.  




















240 - 300 60 – 75 30 – 60 15 3 3 
Headcount planning 
RPN Range 













4.4. Management Errors in Risk Analysis 
The management errors identified did not come from new management tasks. They came 
from exactly the same tasks all managers are expected to do.  According to the research 
data, resources development and management, and project planning and communication 
are the tasks from which the mangers of the group concerned have a problem on. This 
data is helpful for the managers in terms of determining which to prioritize in their action 
plans for their process improvement plans.  
The problem areas identified in this research, the inadequate human resources 
development and management and the lack of planning and communication problems are 
all barriers to TQM. The reason why most problems re-occur is that not all root-causes 
get prevented. Remedies are being done only on the symptoms. In order to eliminate 
problems, the organization must systematically address each and every cause of the 
problem. For this case, management errors must also be addressed. 
This research showed that HF PFMEA is one methodology that may be used by 
organizations to evaluate human risks, including those coming from the management.  
The benefits this method provides include problem prevention and continuous 
improvement. Accomplishing both will help in the achievement of total quality.  
It must be remembered that achieving total quality involves the participation of every 
single member of the organization.  If everyone is a contributor to the success of quality 
improvement, it also follows that everyone may also contribute to the opposite. This only 
implies that everyone’s process must be checked.  
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4.5. Summary and Conclusion 
HF PFMEA was utilized in the analysis of product functional problems encountered in a 
semiconductor company. The methodology was used to determine the manager errors 
that led to the engineer errors that caused the product issues. The engineer errors were 
used as the link between product functional issues and management errors.  
The FMEA methodology was also used to evaluate those management errors or risks in 
terms of RPN values. Issues with the highest RPN values are the issues that need to be 
prioritized in terms of improvement action plans.  
Results led to the conclusion that the managers of the engineers, who were responsible 
for the product functional problems under study, had problems on resource development 
and management, and project planning and communication. These are the areas that the 
managers need to improve on. The highest RPN values were found to have come from 
management’s project communication problem. This is the area where the improvement 
efforts need to start at.  
The author believes that if these problem areas will be addressed, issue recurrences will 
be minimized, if not totally eliminated. The author collected issue-recurrences data in 
order to show the possible improvement impact this research’s data has, if used properly. 
Figure 6 shows issues that recurred even with the addition of more automation and 
process changes. The author believes that if the manager errors will be addressed, those 
recurrences would be minimized, if not totally avoided. 
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Figure 6. Issues caught per week showing problem recurrences. (Data collected by author 
to check for issue recurrences.) 
WW01 WW02 WW04 WW05 WW06 WW08 WW10 WW13 WW14 WW17 WW18 WW19 WW20 WW21 WW23 WW25 WW27 WW29 WW36 WW38 WW41 WW42
Production 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Code Review 0 0 3 2 3 1 2 1 3 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 1 5
Correlation 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Pilot Run 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 1 1 0 1






















Issues/Errors caught per week
 
 
In conclusion, the author was able to show the data that management errors contribute to 
product functional problems. Those management error risks were also evaluated and 
assessed using the HF PFMEA method. From the research data, improvement plans may 
be devised and implemented. Addressing the management problems on resource 
development and management, and project planning and communication are contributory 
to TQM effort.  
This work suggests that managers also contribute to issues that lead to product functional 
problems.   These issues need to be addressed and the results from which are beneficial in 
the achievement of total quality.  
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Chapter 5 – Suggestions for Additional Work 
This research focused on the severity of the effect with respect to product functionality.  
The author suggests that the same research method could be employed, to analyze issues 
and processes, with focus on the severity of the effect with respect to schedule. Such 
research method will generate data that could be helpful in process optimizations to save 
time. 
Another suggestion is to apply the HF PFMEA methodology in the analysis and 
evaluation of other engineering processes. Doing so could reveal more data that could be 
useful for the organization’s problem prevention and process and quality improvement 
efforts. The implementation of HF PFMEA methodology on a variety of human 
processes could also reveal useful data for the development of a model that could be 
useful for management risk analysis.  
Another possible path of study on the subject could be the research and implementation 
of other systematic tools for the human-error analysis. Different problem-solving 
methods apply to different organizations, depending on their business type of operations 
and cultures. Implementing a systematic methodology that applies to the type of business 








Bolanos, Eduardo. 2007. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Presented in CVAT FMEA 
training, November 15-18, 2007, in Cavite, Philippines.  
Bolanos, Eduardo. 2007. Human Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Reducing Human 
Error Rates’ Contribution to Customer Perceived Quality Incidents. Presented at 
the ATM Tech Even, 2007. 
Bolanos, Eduardo. 2006. FMEA Ranks’ reference criteria tables, rev04a. Internal 
Publication.  
Brunetti, Wayne H. 1993. Achieving Total Quality. Integrating Business Strategy and 
Customer Needs. Quality Resources A division of The Kraus Organization Limited. 
Dunkle, David C. 2005. Prioritizing Human Interface Design Issues for Range Safety 
Systems using Human Factors Process FMEA. NASA Risk Management 
Conference. 
http://rmc.nasa.gov/presentations/Dunkle_Human_Interface_Design_Issues_FMEA
.pdf (accessed March 15, 2009) 
Fallon, William K. 1983. AMA Management Handbook Second Edition. AMACOM 
Special Projects Division. American Management Associations.  
Finzel, Hans. 1994. The Top Ten Mistakes Leaders Make. Victor Books/SP Publications, 
Inc. 
Hashmi, Khuram. 2003. Introduction to Implementation of Total Quality Management 
(TQM). iSixSigma.com. http://www.isixsigma.com/library/content/c031008a.asp 
(accessed: August 14, 2009) 
Helmreich, R. L. 1998. Error Management as Organisational Strategy. The University of 
Texas Aerospace Crew Research Project. 
http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/group/HelmreichLAB/Publications/pubfi
les/Pub225.pdf (accessed March 15, 2009)  
Redmill, Felix. 2006. Understanding the Risks Posed by Management. Fourteenth Safety-
critical Systems Symposium, 
http://www.csr.ncl.ac.uk/FELIX_Web/Safety%20Management.pdf (accessed March 
10, 2009)  
Redmill, Felix. 2002 Human Factors in Risk Analysis. Engineering Management Journal 
Vol. 12, No. 4, August, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1029465&isnumber=22115 
(accessed March 10, 2009) 
37 
 
Redmill, Felix. 2002. The Significance to Risk Analysis of Risks Posed by Humans.  
Engineering Management Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, August. 
http://www.csr.ncl.ac.uk/FELIX_Web/5F.Risks%20Posed%20by%20Humans.pdf 
(accessed March 10, 2009) 
Redmill, Felix. 2002. Some Dimensions of Risk not Often Considered by Engineers. 
Journal of System Safety, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 2002. 
http://www.csr.ncl.ac.uk/FELIX_Web/5C.Some%20Dimensions%20of%20Risk.pd
f (accessed March 10. 2009) 
 Sebastianelli, Rose and Tamimi, Nabil. 2003. Understanding the Obstacles to TQM 
Success. American Society for Quality, 
http://www.asq.org/pub/qmj/past/vol10_issue3/qmjv10i3sebastianelli.pdf (accessed 
September 5, 2009) 
Tan Chee Eng; Amin Mohd Sani; Puay Kim Yu. 2006. Methods to Achieve Zero Human 
Error in Semiconductors Manufacturing. Electronics Packaging Technology 
Conference, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=4147324&isnumber=4141004 
(accessed March 10, 2009) 
Tari, Juan Jose, Molina Jose Francisco, and Castejon, Juan Luis. 2005. The relationship 
between quality management practices and their effects on quality outcomes. 





























SEV OCC DET RPN 
Potential Cause /  



















TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
1 10 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 20 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 30 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 40 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is over-confident 
2 20 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 20 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 40 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
















TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator was not able to read bin matrix release memo 
-> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
1 20 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator was not able to read bin matrix release memo 
-> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 40 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 




TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 80 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is biased or over-confident 
2 40 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 40 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 80 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 



















TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
1 25 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 50 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 75 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 100 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work 
-> TP integrator is bias that he/she didn't commit an 
integration mistake  
2 50 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 50 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 100 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator is bias that 






















TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
1 10 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 20 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 30 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 40 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is bias that he/she didn't commit an 
integration mistake  
2 20 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 20 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 40 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator is bias that 

























TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
1 1 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 2 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 3 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 4 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 




TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 2 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 4 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator is bias that 
























TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
1 25 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 50 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 75 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 100 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work 
-> TP integrator is bias that he/she didn't commit an 
integration mistake  
2 50 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 50 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 100 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator is bias that 









10 1 2 20 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 

















TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator accidentally deleted the memo 
2 40 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 60 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 80 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is biased or over-confident 
2 40 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> No one 
available  to train him/her -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
2 40 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 
detection controls in place -> TP integrator didn't know 
-> TP integrator didn't receive training -> no standard 
training plan for TP integrators --> poor resource 
development planning 
4 80 
TP integrator didn't do necessary preventive and 














1 6 1 6 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 
memo -> TP integrator was not copied in the memo 
TP integrator is using an older bin matrix file -> TP 
integrator is not aware of a newer bin matrix file 
-> TP integrator was not able to read bin matrix release 















TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 3 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 4 
TP integrator didn't double check his/her work -> TP 
integrator is biased or over-confident 
4 4 
TP integrator didn't know he/she needs to connect the 
test segment -> TP integrator received insufficient 
information about this requirement -> TP integrator 
received incomplete requirement during the TP 
changes input collection meeting -> poor project 




TP integrator didn't know he/she needs to connect the 
test segment -> TP integrator didn’t fully understand 
that he/she needs to connect the test segment -> TP 















TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 3 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 4 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is biased or over-confident 
TP 
integrator 











TP integrator didn't know he/she needs to put the test 
segment -> TP integrator received insufficient 
information about this requirement -> TP integrator 
received incomplete requirement during the TP 
changes input collection meeting -> poor project 
management and communication 
1 100 
TP integrator didn't know he/she needs to put the test 
segment -> TP integrator didn’t fully understand that 
he/she needs to connect the test segment -> TP 


















TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 240 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 320 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
















TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 300 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 400 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 














TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 300 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 400 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 















TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 300 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 400 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is biased or over-confident  
4 400 
TP integrator didn't fully understand the requirements 
of the new flow -> TP integrator received insufficient 
information about the new flow --> poor project 
management and communication 
1 100 
TP integrator didn't fully understand the requirements 
of the new flow -> TP integrator lacks the necessary 
competencies or knowledge about the new flow -> TP 











TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> resource constraint -> 
poor headcount planning 
3 15 
TP integrator committed a typographical error -> 
fatigue -> too much workload -> poor workload 
planning 
4 20 
TP integrator didn't double check his./her work -> TP 
integrator is biased or over-confident 
4 20 
TP integrator didn't fully understand the requirements 
of the new flow -> TP integrator received insufficient 
information about the new flow --> poor project 
management and communication 
1 5 
TP integrator didn't fully understand the requirements 
of the new flow -> TP integrator lacks the necessary 
competencies or knowledge about the new flow -> TP 
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